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The first Boston Fed conference, 25 years ago in June 1969, bore the
title, Controlling Monetary Aggregates. The conference volume leads off
with a panel discussion, begun by Paul Samuelson. He opened his
remarks with a one-sentence paragraph: "The central issue that is
debated these days in connection with macro-economics is the doctrine
of monetarism" (Samuelson 1969, p. 7). The background of that confer-
ence was the rising rate of inflation and accumulating evidence that
excessive money growth was the cause of the problem. The principal
question debated was whether the Fed should adopt a monetary target
and abandon tight control of the federal funds rate.
Today we are dealing with what appears to be the opposite
problem. The inflation rate has fallen to levels not seen since the early
1960s, but experience over the past decade or so seems to show that
inflation is no longer closely related to money growth. Nevertheless, the
question concerning the best target for the Fed to pursue remains the
same. The organizers of this conference have framed the topic for this
session as follows: "Monetary policy has often been characterized as
attempting to maintain an intermediate target, such as a monetary
aggregate, within a target range. However, changing financial markets
have called into question the reliability of the relationships between
intermediate targets and ultimate goals of monetary policy .... Should
monetary policy abandon intermediate targets?"
With all due respect to my friends at the Boston Fed, the question
is misstated. The quoted passage should read, "Should monetary policy
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have abandoned monetary targeting? Is the federal funds rate a satisfac-
torymonetary policy instrument?" I rephrase the question because there
can be no doubt that over the past few years the Fed’s policy has focused
on setting the funds rate and that money growth, however defined, now
plays at best a marginal role. Indeed, the significance of money stock
data in policy decisions seems considerably less than that of aggregate
data such as the industrial production index and the consumer price
index. The Fed still believes that money stock data are somewhat more
important than, say, Rhode Island retail sales data, but not much more
important.
The Fed is obviously uneasy with this situation, as it should be.
Nothing has changed to eliminate the potential perils in controlling the
fed funds rate. Yet, who can quarrel with success? Following the 1982
recession the economy enjoyed an unusually long economic expansion,
which ended in an unusually mild contraction. During the expansion,
the core CPI inflation rate remained fairly steady at about 41/2 percent per
year, and last year inflation was below 3 percent. It is true that the
expansion following the mild 1990-91 recession got off to a slow start,
and perhaps the Fed could have done things a little differently. Perfec-
tion, though, is a damn tough standard; it makes much more sense to
emphasize departures from historical experience than from the dream
world of macroeconomic bliss. On the realistic standard of history, the
Fed has performed well indeed in recent years.
How can monetary policy research contribute to maintaining the
Fed’s excellent performance in the years to come? Proponents of
monetarist policy prescriptions--those who want the Fed to resume
paying attention to money growth targets--have devoted their research
to, among other things, the stability of the money demand function, the
regularities of the cyclical behavior of monetary aggregates, and the
principles of defining monetary aggregates. Opponents of monetarist
policy prescriptions--those who argue the case for the fed funds policy
instrument--have devoted their research to, among other things, the
instability of the money demand function, the irregularities of the
cyclical behavior of monetary aggregates, and the problems with all
existing definitions of monetary aggregates. Strangely, those who ad-
vocate that the Fed controi the fed funds rate base their case almost
entirely on the case against monetary aggregates. The funds rate as a
monetary target really has not received much academic study.
This imbalance of research effort is unfortunate, given that mone-
tary policy ought to be based on a comparison of the relative advantages
and disadvantages of various approaches. My first published paper on
this subject, about 25 years ago (Poole 1970a), emphasized that the
practical issue then facing the Federal Reserve was to choose between
controlling some monetary aggregate and some interest rate, and that
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the interest rate would be the more reliable policy instrument. The issue
today remains the same. The enormous literature on monetary policy
has clarified many of the issues, but few of the protagonists who have
been in this intellectual battle over the years have changed their minds
on how the Fed should run its policy.
Part of the problem, as just suggested, is that most of the research
has been focused on monetary aggregates and too little has been focused
on how the Fed has, or should, employ an interest-rate instrument. The
obvious problems in recent years in using monetary aggregates have
permitted the federal funds rate to win the policy competition by
default. This paper will review the major considerations involving the
monetary aggregates, and then present some new findings concerning
the role of interest rates in monetary policy.
Policy Goals, Policy Instruments,
and Intermediate Targets
Policy analysis has long been based on a framework distinguishing
policy goals, intermediate targets, and policy instruments. Despite the
widespread use of this framework, those using it are not always very
precise about exactly how they interpret the main concepts. Thus, this
paper begins with a few comments on how I view this framework, and
on which aspects of various disputes are relevant here.
Policy Goals
One issue that has been settled is that the structure of the economy
does not contain a long-run trade-off between employment and infla-
tion. Not settled is whether a short-run trade-off exists and, if it does, its
nature and stability. Attitudes toward this issue do affect policy posi-
tions, but for the purposes of this paper the trade-off debate can be
ignored. It will be assumed that the ultimate goal of monetary policy in
the long run is to keep inflation low, and that the goal in the short run
is to maximize an objective function that depends on the levels and
stability of employment and inflation in the current and future periods.
The connection between the short run and the long run depends on the
Fed’s discount rate and the risks it is willing to take, including political
risks arising from pressures from the Congress and the Administration.
The argument here will depend little on the precise nature of the structure
of the economy within which the policy optimization takes place.
A common argument, but one that makes no sense to me, contends
that the Fed should simply concentrate on achieving its ultimate goals.
Some inflation hawks, for example, want the Fed to follow a "price
rule." Others want the Fed to target nominal GDP growth "directly."
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how the Fed should adjust its policy instruments in pursuit of policy
goals. Economists differ much less in their views on the goals they want
to achieve than in their views on how to adjust policy instruments to
achieve the goals. Some of the confusion arises because the issue of
political control over monetary policy gets mixed up with technical
issues concerning relationships between instruments and goals. Al-
though the main purpose of this paper is to examine technical issues, a
short digression on political control over monetary policy seems in order.
Political Control of Monetary Policy
A central bank is. ultimately responsible to the voters, and econo-
mists have long been interested in the question of how monetary policy
goals are and should be determined in a democracy. The issue is partly
one of political economy and partly one of the effectiveness of monetary
policy in terms of the behavior of the variables in the objective function
--the level and stability of employment, inflation, interest rates, and
whatever other variables might be considered.
Democracies exercise control over central banks in a number of
different ways in different countries, and a lively literature exists on how
best to organize this control. In some countries, the central bank reports
directly to the treasury or finance ministry, and through that depart-
ment to the president or prime minister. In other countries, the United
States included, the central bank has a substantial degree of indepen-
dence from the executive branch, and the objectives of policy are
determined primarily by the appointed central bankers with a minimum
of legislated guidance from the legislature. (Of course, legislative and
executive branch commentary ranging from thoughtful analysis to
political potshots is common, but commentary should not be confused
with formal legislation.) In both sets of countries--those with relatively
independent central banks and those with central banks controlled
directly by the party in power--policy goals typically are vague and
poorly defined. Political discourse focuses on inflation and unemploy-
ment, and other less important issues, but the emphasis changes over
time and the goals are usually a little more or a little less, with
substantial uncertainty over exactly what the operative goals are at any
particular time.
The situation was quite different under the classic gold standard.
The government, including the central bank, had as its primary mone-
tary policy goal the maintenance of convertibility of the country’s paper
money into gold at a fixed price. That policy goal, for better or for worse,
was very specific and widely supported within the gold-standard
countries. New Zealand has recently taken a similar direction. Under
the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Act of 1989, price stability is the sole
objective of monetary policy (Fischer 1993, p. 2). The Reserve Bank ofMONETARY AGGREGATES TARGETING IN A LOW-INFLATION ECONOMY 91
New Zealand operates under a contract negotiated between the minister
of finance and the Reserve Bank governor to achieve zero inflation, and
the governor may be fired for failing to reach the target (pp. 8-10).1
Legislative determination of policy goals must take one of two
forms: a performance standard or an instrumental standard. New Zealand
has decided on a performance standard; the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand has the task of determining how to adjust its policy instruments
to achieve the legislated goal of price stability. Milton Friedman has long
favored an instrumental standard in the form of a legislated target for
money growth or the monetary base.2 The issues in legislated standards
will not be considered here, but rather the simple point that however the
goals of policy are determined, the issue remains of how to control
instruments to reach the goals. The legislature decides this question
when it sets an instrumental standard; the central bank must decide the
question when attempting to meet a legislated performance standard. In
the absence of a clear legislated standard the situation prevailing in the
United States--the central bank must have some goal or other in mind,
explicitly or implicitly, and must adjust policy instruments to best
achieve that goal.
The instrumental issue would be irrelevant or uninteresting if the
relationship between instruments and goals were so precise that errors
in achieving goals were economically irrelevant. At the present state of
knowledge, such errors are far from irrelevant. We simply do not know
with much precision what the outcome will be of adjusting policy
instruments in particular ways. Thus, no possibility exists that a "price
rule" or "direct targeting" will make the instrumental question irrele-
vant in the foreseeable future. Arguing for such an approach ducks the
key issue of how to achieve the goals of policy.
Intermediate Targets
It is conventional to define the instruments of Federal Reserve
policy to be open market operations, the discount rate, and reserve
requirements, and to treat the federal funds rate and some monetary
aggregate as possible intermediate targets. This conventional taxonomy
is more confusing than enlightening. From a control-theoretic point of
view, an instrument is any variable that can be controlled without error
or, more practically, with an error that is small relative to the error in
controlling the ultimate goal variables. A narrow monetary aggregate
(the monetary base, bank reserves, or M1) could be controlled with
errors that are very small relative to the errors in controlling the price
1 Canada also has a zero inflation target, but the arrangement is somewhat more
vague and less formal than in New Zealand. See Fischer (1993).
2 For an early statement of Friedman’s views on this issue, see M. Friedman (1959).92 William Poole
level or nominal GDP. The Federal Reserve can also control the federal
funds rate within a narrow range, day by day. Thus, a narrow monetary
aggregate and the federal funds rate will be treated here as possible
policy instruments rather than as intermediate targets.3
The problems of controlling M2 and other broad monetary aggre-
gates are much greater than the problems of controlling narrow aggre-
gates. M2 should not, I believe, be thought of as a policy instrument; if
the central bank is to pursue an M2 target, it should be viewed as an
intermediate target between policy instruments and policy goals. The
problems of targeting intermediate variables were explained years ago
by Benjamin Friedman (1975). Basically, pursuing an intermediate target
adds a layer of control errors that makes control of the final goal
variables less accurate than it could be by operating on policy instru-
ments directly. Thus, from a technical point of view, there is every
reason not to employ intermediate targets but to analyze policy in terms
of the best settings for policy instruments to achieve the policy goals.
A possible argument for a role for intermediate targets is in
explaining policy to the general public. The public might not understand
the rationale for adjusting policy instruments in particular ways but
might understand the significance of intermediate targets. For example,
if open market operations are viewed as the instrument, then the Fed
would surely lose its audience in explaining why $8.8 billion of 3-day
matched-sale transactions were necessary this week to offset the net of
float, changes in Treasury balances, and the reflux of currency after the
Memorial Day weekend. It is much more insightful to say that the target
is a particular federal funds rate, or a desired rate of M1 growth.
However, if the federal funds rate, or M1 growth, can be achieved with
a small margin of error, these variables might as well be called "policy
instruments" in the first place.
If an intermediate variable cannot be controlled reasonably accu-
rately, then the concept does not help to promote public understanding
of monetary policy. Faced with large errors in controlling an intermedi-
ate variable, the Fed will get bogged down explaining the errors either
as unavoidable control errors or as deliberate misses reflecting improved
control of ultimate goals by appropriate settings of policy instruments.
Both of these points are relevant to the Fed’s attitude toward M2 in
3 For those not used to thinking about policy instruments and intermediate targets in
these terms, note that today the Fed can control the federal funds rate, which is usually
considered an intermediate target, more precisely (as measured by the standard deviation
of the actual rate as a ratio to the target rate) than it can its total assets, which are usually
considered a policy instrument. The Fed’s assets fluctuate as a consequence of such things
as changes in bank borrowing at the discount window, transactions with foreign
governments and central banks, and the speed of check-clearing, which affects items in the
process of collection. If more accurate control of a particular instrument is desired, changes
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recent years. With the substantial change in bank behavior in bidding
for small time certificates, the spread between the certificate yield and
open market interest rates has changed. As a consequence, M2 has
appeared less controllable than some had thought in the past and less
closely related to nominal GDP. The Fed thought, correctly in my
opinion, that it could do a better job of controlling the economy by
controlling the federal funds rate appropriately than by targeting a
predetermined path for M2.
Targets for Policy Instruments: Announce or Not?
The issue of the choice of the policy instrument should be kept
separate from the issue of whether the Fed should announce and adhere
to an annual target path for the chosen instrument. The case for
announcing settings for policy instruments states that adhering to
announced targets creates greater certainty about policy in the private
sector and provides valuable policy discipline.
A policy of adhering to an announced path for a policy instrument
requires that ultimate goal variables be related to the instruments in a
reliable way. More precisely, it should not be possible to achieve sig-
nificant gains in the performance of the goal variables by adjusting
policy instruments continuously rather than adhering to predetermined
paths for instruments. If large gains are possible, then the pressure on
the Fed to grab those gains will be substantial. Clearly, if discipline over
policy can be maintained some other way, as with performance stan-
dards enforced somehow or other, then there is every reason to improve
policy performance by permitting departures of instruments from their
planned paths.
As far as I know, no advocate of a funds rate target has ever called
for the Fed to adhere to a target path for the funds rate announced a year
in advance, or even three months in advance. The Fed’s decision to
abandon efforts to hit an announced money growth target need not have
led to concentration on the fed funds rate; the Fed could have adopted
a system of setting short-run targets for money growth or reserves
growth in much the same way as it now sets short-run ranges for the fed
funds rate.
A policy built around continuous adjustments of a policy instru-
ment requires relatively little information about the relationship of the
instrument to the goal variables. The Fed obviously needs to know the
direction of the effect, all other things being equal, and needs some feel
for the magnitude and timing of the effects. The information require-
ments are not really very different from those for the driver of a car. The
direction of effects from applying accelerator and brake are known, and
an ordinary driver quickly learns about how much of each policy
instrument to apply in various situations. The control problem is fairly94 William Poole
robust to control errors; to slow down, apply the brake, and if the car
is not slowing fast enough, apply a little more brake. The Fed in fact
operates primarily by feeding back from current observations on the
economy; on the basis of these observations and long experience, the
Fed raises or lowers the fed funds rate a little more or a little less. If
raising the funds rate over the first half of 1994 does not appear to be
slowing the economy enough, then the Fed will raise the rate a bit more,
and a bit more after that if necessary. This procedure certainly is not
perfect, and occasionally the Fed has behaved about as predictably and
competently as a drunken driver. But on the whole, the process has
worked amazingly well in recent years.
The Fed could follow the same approach with an M1 instrument
instead of with the fed funds rate; in fact, a strong case can be made for
paying much more attention to M1 than has been true in recent years.
To make that case, this paper will begin by reviewing some monetary
regularities.
Understanding Monetary Regularities
Analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of targeting
the money stock or the interest rate must begin with accumulated
knowledge about gross monetary regularities concerning monetary
aggregates and interest rates.
Monetary Aggregates Regularities
Perhaps the most important of monetary aggregates regularities is
that large differences in rates of inflation are associated systematically
with large differences in rates of money growth. Figures 1 and 2 tell a
story that has long been well-documented.4 These figures provide a
cross-section view of the relationship between money growth and
inflation for all countries reported in the tables in the back of the World
Bank’s World Development Report, 1993. Countries with a high rate of
money growth experience a high rate of inflation. In a scatter diagram
for a large sample of countries, the points lie approximately along the
diagonal; the higher the rate of money growth, the higher the rate of
inflation. This result conforms with standard monetary theory. All other
things being equal, an exogenously higher rate of money growth yields
a higher inflation rate; in equilibrium the inflation rate will equal the rate
of growth of money per unit of real GDP.5
4 Figures 1 and 2 are reproduced from Poole (1994a). For another recent study, see
Duck (1993).
~ Depending on tastes in macro theory, a few more conditions might have to be added
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Figure 1
Money Growth and Inflation: All Countries
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993, Tables 1, 2, and 13.
Reproduced from Poole (1994a).
When dealing with rates of inflation of 20, or 50, or 200 percent per
year, no one disputes that lower money growth is essential to reduce
inflation. But in considering countries with lower and lower inflation
rates, the relationship between money growth and inflation appears to
be less and less reliable. In Figure 2, the points farthest off the diagonal
are for countries with relatively low inflation rates. In Figure 1, the
relationship between money growth and inflation seems quite loose for
the 1980-91 period. The relationship between money growth and
inflation (or nominal GDP growth) becomes less exact when inflation is
lower, for two main reasons. One has to do with behavior in the private
economy and the other with monetary policy.
When inflation is low, so also are nominal interest rates. In practice,
a substantial part of the narrow money stock in most countries bears
conditions is of minor importance in explaining departures from the diagonal in figures
such as these, Problems with the underlying data are surely more important.96 William Poole
Figure 2
Money Growth and Inflation: High-Income Countries
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1993, Tables 1,2, and 13.
Reproduced from Poole (1994a).
little or no interest. When nominal interest rates are low, the opportu-
nity cost to holding money is low, and people hold larger real balances.
Moreover, the penalty for holding balances that are temporarily larger
than they need to be is small. Thus, fluctuations in the amount of money
created by the central bank (either purposely or inadvertently as a
consequence of other policies) are largely absorbed in fluctuations in the
amount of real balances held rather than in the rate of inflation. I know
of no systematic study of how the lag between money growth and
inflation depends on the rate of inflation, but my distinct impression is
that the lag is short when inflation is high and long when inflation is
low. In Cagan’s (1956) classic study of hyperinflation, the lag between
changes in money growth and changes in the inflation rate was
measured in weeks. In the United States, the conventional view has
been that the lag between money growth and inflation is approximately
two years. It makes sense that the lag should be short when the cost of
failing to adjust is high, and that the lag should be long when the cost
of failing to adjust is low. A consequence of long lags is that theMONETARY AGGREGATES TARGETING IN A LOW-INFLATION ECONOMY 97
year-to-year relationship between money growth and inflation will be
more variable. Higher money growth may yield little inflation at first,
and inflation may rise, perhaps in response to prior money growth, at a
time when money growth is low.
A second consideration, one not well understood in today’s debates
over monetary policy, is that a predictable consequence of optimal
monetary policy is that the correlation between monetary policy instru-
ments and policy goals will be driven to zero. This issue is discussed in
some detail in another paper (Poole 1994b), but the equations from that
paper are reported here and the issue will be reviewed briefly.
Consider the following simple model:
Y = ao + a~X + ~M + e O)
with means/z~ --/zx = 0, variances o~, O~x, and covariance O-~x = 0. The
central bank observes the vector X, and adjusts M to offset the effects of
X on Y (GDP). The optimal M is
Yf- o~o -
M* =                                            (2)
where Yf is the target level of GDP. We can show that
o’~’M = 0. (3)
Now suppose M is not set at M* but instead at
M=AM*, h>l, =1, or <1. (4)
Then,
= - + - a
(5)
If k = 1.0, then rrrM = 0
< 1.0, then ~rrM < 0 (6)
> 1.0, then O’yM > O.
If monetary policy is optimal (h = 1.0), then M and Y are uncor-
related. If monetary policy underreacts to information in X !h < 1.0),98 William Poole
then money and GDP are negatively correlated. The intuition of this
apparently strange result is straightforward. Suppose that X rises,
which tends to push up Y, and that policymakers respond by reduc-
ing M. However, when policy underreacts, M does not decline by
enough to offset the full effects of X and a negative correlation between
M and Y is observed. If policy overreacts (,~ > 1.0), then monetary
disturbances dominate the outcome, yielding a positive correlation
between M and Y.
The intuition of this result is clear, once intuition is developed by
thinking through the common sense of the result. An optimal monetary
policy makes use of all available information to produce the best possible
result for the goal variables. To keep things simple, suppose the goal of
policy is constant growth of nominal GDP.6 Any correlation remaining
in the data between the policy instruments (and any other variables
known at the time the instruments are set) and growth in nominal GDP
represents a lost opportunity to produce a better policy. If, for example,
a positive correlation is observed between money growth and depar-
tures of GDP growth from its target rate, then the central bank could
have produced a better result by raising or lowering money growth to
keep GDP growth closer to target,v U.S. monetary policy really has been
much better since 1982 than before, and that is the most important
reason why the correlation between money growth and GDP growth
has become so small, as documented by Friedman and Kuttner (1992).
An implication of this argument is that the search for a better
monetary aggregate, as measured by its correlation to nominal GDP, is
doomed to failure if the central bank is doing a good job. Suppose
careful statistical analysis uncovers a better monetary aggregate. Then,
once the central bank uses the aggregate optimally, the correlation
between the aggregate and nominal GDP will be driven to zero. Given
the aggregate, fluctuations in nominal GDP will reflect unavoidable
random disturbances and measurement error. The important implica-
6 If the utility function of the policymakers depends on a number of variables, nominal
GDP need only be replaced in this argument by the evaluated utility function. That is, take
all the individual goals such as inflation, unemployment, and so forth, and then calculate
the level of utility from realizations of the individual goals. In the general argument, this
calculated level of utility replaces the growth rate of GDP in the argument in the text.
7 For an everyday analogy, when driving on an interstate in the mountains, your car
may travel at a nearly constant speed of 65 mph but the amount of gas being fed to the
engine will vary greatly depending on whether the car is going uphill or down. If you are
successful at keeping close to 65 mph, the correlation between gas flow to the engine and
the speed of the car will be zero. Assuming the car has a large enough engine, any
non-zero correlation between speed and gas flow to the engine during the period when
the target speed is 65 mph would be evidence that you are not driving as skillfully as
possible. Of course, this analogy assumes that the only goal variable is speed of 65 mph;
however, the illustration could easily be extended to consider a more complicated utility
function.MONETARY AGGREGATES TARGETING IN A LOW-INFLATION ECONOMY 99
tion of this argument is that the Fed must choose its policy instruments
largely on the basis of evidence from periods when policy was not
optimal and from economic theory.8 Practical experience in using policy
instruments may also be important.
The same argument applies to the federal funds rate or any other
instrument of policy. Optimal use of the instrument will destroy all
simple correlations between the instrument and the goals of policy. In
principle, causal mechanisms could be sorted out econometrically if
good estimates were available of the shocks to which the central bank is
responding as it adjusts its instruments. However, in practice the central
bank responds to a wide and changing range of information, and there
is little hope of untangling causal mechanisms with any degree of
reliability in an optimal control environment. Indeed, it is in principle
impossible to identify econometrically the Fed’s response to one-of-a-
kind disturbances such as the stock market crash; no estimation is
possible with a sample of one in the period at issue. During the 1980s,
the Fed reacted successfully to a variety of such disturbances.
If policy is optimal (or nearly so) over some period, a search for
variables correlated with deviations of goal variables from their target
levels may uncover spurious correlations.9 With a short enough sample
period and a long enough list of series, some series or other is bound to
be suitably correlated. Once a reasonably successful policy regime is
established, as I believe it has been since 1982, improvements will be
difficult to come by. To avoid the problem of acting on the basis of
spurious correlations, proposed improvements will have to be consid-
ered provisional until enough new data have arrived to show that the
correlations are genuine rather than spurious.
Interest Rate Regularities
As for interest rates, an important regularity in the present context
is that sustained higher inflation yields higher interest rates. A second is
that, other things being equal, raising interest rates tends to depress
8 This point is quite general. For example, as a practical matter the characteristics of
the long-run Phillips curve cannot be tested without observations of permanent, or
long-lasting, changes in the rate of inflation, because inflation expectations cannot be
observed without error. U.S. data did not fit the Friedman-Phelps argument for a vertical
long-run Phillips curve until the sample included the higher inflation rates of the late
1960s. In the larger sample, the error in observing expectations was small relative to the
variance in actual, and therefore expected, inflation over the sample period.
9 For this reason, I have serious reservations about recent work constructing broader
monetary aggregates by adding bond and stock mutual funds to the existing M2. No clear
theoretical reason exists for constructing such an aggregate; although households with
mutual funds can readily turn them into cash by making a phone call, businesses can do
the same with all their liquid assets.100 William Poole
economic activity and inflation. These twin facts produce a problem for
monetary policy and for public understanding of it. To lower interest
rates over the long run, the central bank must first raise rates to reduce
inflation. Stating the proposition in the other direction, a consequence of
lowering interest rates too much (or failing to raise them enough in time)
is that inflation rises and sooner or later interest rates rise more than
they otherwise would have.
As a baseline prediction, raising money growth by a sustained rate
of 1 percentage point will lead to a sustained increase in inflation of
I percentage point. Such an increase in inflation will, as a baseline case,
yield a 1 percentage point increase in the nominal rate of interest.
Although the direction of effects outlined in the previous paragraph is
clear, no baseline prediction exists to provide guidance as to how much
or how fast inflation will rise if the central bank, say, lowers interest
rates by 1 percentage point from an initial point of equilibrium. The
problem is that an economic model with a permanently fixed nominal
interest rate set by the central bank has no determined price level. A
consequence of this fact is that a central bank cannot calculate the
appropriate interest rate target but must instead adjust interest rates
up or down, a little more or a little less, on the basis of its feel for the
economy.
Of course, given a specific macro model, with fully specified
structure and expectations mechanisms, the appropriate interest rate for
the central bank to set can indeed be calculated. However, no model
exists that commands general support as being reliable in this sense. In
fact, it is fair to say that while models can be used to illustrate general
principles, no advocate of interest-rate control by a central bank would
want to use a model to calculate the appropriate interest rate and then
adjust the rate as indicated by the model. Rather, what the Federal
Reserve does, and what advocates of interest-rate targeting recommend,
is to adjust rates up or down based on a wide variety of information
about developments in the economy. This is not meant to imply that this
process cannot work well; it is simply an attempt to understand what
actually happens. As a driver, I may have no idea how to calculate how
much pressure to apply to brake and accelerator, but I can drive quite
successfully by applying a little more or a little less based on long
experience.
To sum up these points, as a baseline case higher money growth
can be expected to yield higher inflation, and the relationship will lie
approximately along the diagonal of a diagram such as Figure 1. Further,
higher inflation can be expected to yield higher nominal interest
rates--in equilibrium, approximately one for one. Departures from
these baseline cases, especially in the short run, will be more pro-
nounced the lower the average rate of inflation. A central bank fixing the
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equilibrium; a monetary policy based on interest-rate control must
constantly adjust rates up or down to keep the economy on track. With
regard to interest-rate targets, no solid information is available to
indicate how much up or down, or how fast or slow, is required for a
satisfactory outcome.
Issues in Money Stock Targeting
Starting in the mid 1970s, the Federal Reserve increasingly sup-
ported a monetary policy placing substantial emphasis on achieving
money growth targets. In the mid 1980s, the Fed switched its emphasis
from M1, which it had traditionally favored over other monetary
aggregates, to M2. Over the course of the late 1980s, the relationship
between money growth however defined and nominal GDP seemed less
and less reliable, and the Fed’s attention to money growth targets
waned to the point of nearly vanishing.
With regard to M1, the main issue is that the interest elasticity of
demand for M1 is considerably higher than estimated in the mid 1970s.
In first taking up this issue (Poole 1970b), I argued that estimates of
income and interest elasticities from postwar data were not well deter-
mined because of the long, rising trends in both real income and interest
rates. I now believe that economists made a mistake in attributing rising
velocity of M1 between 1946 and 1980 to some combination of a real
income elasticity below unity and an exogenous trend. The consequence
of this mistake was an estimate of the interest elasticity that was much
too low, in the neighborhood of -0.1 to -0.2. Current estimates of the
interest elasticity of demand for M1 suggest a number in the neighbor-
hood of -0.5 (see Hoffman and Rasche 1991).
A relatively high (in absolute value) interest elasticity creates a
major problem for a predetermined target for M1 growth. A real
disturbance, or a substantial change in inflation expectations, may
require a large change in interest rates if the economy is to remain dose
to full employment or expand along the desired path for nominal GDP.
To illustrate the magnitude of this problem, consider the transition from
the inflation rate of the late 1970s to the lower inflation rate of the mid
1980s. In the late 1970s, rules advocates (myself included) typically
argued for predetermined, announced gradual reductions in money
growth. Reducing money growth by 1 percentage point per year was a
common recommendation. Suppose the economy were initially fully
adjusted to an ongoing inflation rate of 7 percent per year and nominal
interest rates averaging 10 percent. Now suppose the goal of monetary
policy is to reduce inflation and nominal interest rates by 5 percentage
points. The new equilibrium will have a nominal interest rate of 5102 William Poole
percent. Assuming a conventional money demand function with a
real-income elasticity of 1.0, then
M     Y
In ~- = a + In ~ + b In i (money demand function), and
~, In M- & In Y= b~ In i.
If the interest rate goes from 10 percent to 5 percent, then & In i ~
-0.7. If the interest elasticity is low, say -0.1, then the gap between
money growth and nominal GDP growth is 0.07. If money growth is
constant at 3.5 percent, then two years of zero growth in nominal GDP
will be adequate to create equilibrium in money demand. However,
suppose the interest elasticity of money demand is -0.5. Then, the total
gap between money growth and nominal GDP growth to be bridged is
0.35. If money growth is constant at 3.5 percent, it would take (0.35/
0.035) = 10 years of zero growth in nominal GDP to restore equilibrium
in money demand. To restore equilibrium faster would require some
combination of GDP growth below zero and money growth above 3.5
percent. If money growth is higher, what happens to exPectations of future
inflation when the central bank has staked its reputation on achieving its
M1 target? If the central bank sticks to its money growth target, what
happens to unemployment if growth in nominal GDP is negative?
This simple arithmetic and the best current estimates of the interest
elasticity of money demand have convinced me that a system of keeping
actual M1 growth to targets announced a year in advance is not likely to
work satisfactorily. Interest-rate fluctuations of several percentage
points in a year are not uncommon even during periods in which the
rate of inflation is changing relatively little. I believe that the increased
volatility of M1 velocity after the 1980-82 period of disinflation was
primarily a result of the Fed’s greater success in permitting changes in
interest rates and M1 growth that stabilized, or at least did not
destabilize, the real economy and inflation rate.
That the typical cyclical pattern of money growth and interest rates
changed after 1982 can be seen clearly in Figure 3. After 1982, large
gyrations in money growth and interest rates occurred without a cyclical
contraction until the one beginning in July 1990. M1 growth fell in 1984
as interest rates rose; M1 growth rose significantly in 1985 and 1986 as
interest rates fell. Except for a few months’ interruption following the
stock market crash in October 1987, interest rates rose from late 1986 to
March of 1989 and then fell almost every month before leveling out at
about 3 percent in late 1992. For interest rates to start falling and M1
growth start rising well over a year before the cycle peak, as occurred
before the peak in 1990, is unprecedented in U.S. history back to the first
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The sustained and substantial short-run inverse relationship be-
tween M1 growth and the T-bill rate over the period after 1982 is also
unprecedented in U.S. history, putting aside the periods dominated by
world wars and the Great Depression. 10 The typical pattern before 1982,
allowing for the lag of interest rates behind money growth, was a
positive relationship reflecting the effect of money growth on inflation
and interest rates, and the usual cyclical pattern. For monthly data from
January 1960 through December 1982, the simple correlation between
M1 growth and the T-bill rate is 0.53; for the period January 1983
through January 1994, however, the simple correlation is -0.45.
The change in the cyclical behavior of interest rates and money
growth after 1982 must be attributed primarily to the Federal Reserve.
so The correlation between monthly data for the commercial paper rate and the
12-month growth rate of the Friedman-Schwartz M2 series was slightly negative for the
period May 1908 to December 1960. This outcome is dominated by observations during the
two world wars, the sharp recession in 1920-21, and the Great Depression. An examina-
tion of a graph of the data suggests that relatively normal subperiods are characterized by
a positive correlation, but it would seem to be cooking the books to search too hard to find
such periods for the purpose of reporting some positive correlations.104 William Poole
Except for the period from October 1979 to (about) October 1982, the Fed
has always conducted policy by adjusting money market interest rates.
Policy has focused sometimes on borrowed reserves, sometimes on free
reserves, and sometimes on the federal funds rate, but these are minor
variations on the basic theme of controlling money market interest rates.
Experience after 1982 demonstrates that it is indeed possible for the
Federal Reserve to base a successful policy on the federal funds rate, by
adjusting that rate in a reasonably timely fashion to yield a satisfactory
outcome for real GDP and inflation. The problem is how to sustain this
good performance.
In principle, it might be possible to define a money growth target
taking account of the interest elasticity of money demand. The an-
nounced target might take the form of a money growth range condi-
tional on interest rates remaining in a certain range, and alternative
higher (lower) money growth ranges conditional on lower (higher)
interest rates. However, it is doubtful whether such an announced
target would provide the predictability to the market and political
constraint on the central bank that advocates of money growth targets
have desired. It seems much better to emphasize a performance stan-
dard than a complicated instrumental standard.
The Federal Reserve adopted an M2 target in the mid 1980s when
theol~ and evidence suggested that M2 velocity was likely to be more
stable than M1 velocity. The argument was that the elasticity of M2 with
respect to market interest rates would be much lower than that for M1
because a large fraction of M2 pays a market-sensitive rate. Moreover;
observed M2 velocity was more stable than was observed M1 velocity. In
the event, M2 velocity did not turn out to remain stable enough for M2
targeting to be satisfactory. The immediate source of instability in M2
velocity was a run-off of small time certificates in M2 after 1990.
The case is weak for aggregating time certificates, large or small,
with currency and bank liabilities payable on demand. It is important to
recognize that the extensive historical research of Friedman and
Schwartz (1963a, 1963b) relies on a definition of M2 that does not match
the current definition. Prior to 1960, bank liabilities in certificate form
were of negligible importance. The concept corresponding to the Fried-
man-Schwartz M2 is what I have called MZM ("money zero maturity");
this measure includes currency plus all assets convertible to currency on
demand at par (that is, without penalty). Without getting further into
the debate on how to define money for policy purposes, it is fair to say
that economists have not delivered a conceptual basis for defining
money that commands general assent and has proven to be entirely
satisfactory for policy purposes.
To summarize various strands in this discussion: When considering
high rates of inflation and the problem of producing a modicum of
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controlling money growth is fully in order. The distortions and ineffi-
ciencies created by a high rate of inflation are so great that taking the
first-order steps to bring down money growth is the major point that
must be discussed with the interested parties. The same argument is
relevant for the United States in the sense that the inflation of the 1970s
could not have been reduced without a period of monetary stringency.
Moreover, the relatively high rate of M1 growth from 1990 through 1993
could not be continued without inflation rising substantially at some
point. In the first half of 1994, the Fed raised money-market interest
rates and reduced M1 growth, adding another data point reinforcing the
substantial negative correlation between M1 growth and interest rates
after 1982.
Central banks in the United States and other high-income countries
with well-developed financial markets have considerable room to permit
substantial changes in M1 growth without adverse consequences. In-
deed, changes in M1 growth in response to changes in interest rates and
other factors can be positively beneficial. The problem is to find a way to
ensure that the "can be" in the previous sentence is reliably translated
to "are typically." The process is certainly not automatic and the risks of
policy mistakes are substantial.
Issues in Interest Rate Targeting
The total absence of a model permitting calculation of the appro-
priate level for the federal funds rate creates a serious problem for the
Fed, and for everyone else as well. Not only does such a model not exist,
but also developing such a model may in principle be impossible. The
Fed cannot set the federal funds rate without regard for market
expectations about the future, as such expectations register in long-term
interest rates. However, the problem is that long-term interest rates
depend critically on market expectations about what the Fed will do in
the future.
The Fed would have a downright easy job if designing monetary
policy were equivalent to an engineering control problem, such as the
design of an autopilot for a ship. In an engineering control problem, the
mechanism to be controlled can be modeled as a system subject to
external shocks. The autopilot monitors instruments showing the devi-
ation from the desired course and speed, and then adjusts control
instruments to keep the ship on its targeted track. Design of the
autopilot must consider the characteristics of the ship and the nature of
the disturbances pushing the ship off course, but the problem is easy
compared to the monetary policy control problem. The wind and
current are not watching the autopilot and trying to anticipate how the
autopilot will adjust the rudder and throttle.106 William Poole
The Fed’s job would be substantially equivalent to an engineering
control problem if most of the shocks hitting the economy had little
or nothing to do with expectations about Fed behavior in the future.
Droughts, floods, OPEC oil shocks, Gulf Wars, and the like are
examples of such shocks. How important are external shocks, compared
to changes in expectations about Fed policy and endogenous business
cycle processes?
To gain a feel for this question, it seems insightful to examine the
behavior of the bond market, which is perhaps the most general and
efficient aggregator of economic information. Large changes in bond yields
presumably reflect new information in the market, or new assessments of
existing information. I know no foolproof way of identifying the reasons
for large changes in bond yields but have looked at reasons identified in
the Wall Street Journal at the time of large changes in yields.
Table I (at the end of this paper) provides the results of this study.11
The table is based on data on the weekly average index of the average
yield on Treasury bonds with maturities of 10 years and over. The data
series runs from 1963 through 1993. The standard deviation of percent-
age (not percentage point) changes in the weekly average yield for the
entire sample is 1.4 percent. The volatility of interest rates is quite
variable, and so a moving standard deviation was constructed covering
104 weeks. The table reports all changes larger in absolute value than
two standard deviations as measured by the moving standard deviation.
This procedure picks up all large changes in yields, where "large" is
defined in the context of the market environment of the time. The table
also includes all changes larger than 2.8 percent (twice the total sample
standard deviation) on the assumption that changes this large are worth
examining even if they occur in a volatile period with a moving standard
deviation greater than 1.4 percent. At the beginning of each entry in the
table, to explain what was going on at the time of a large change in the
bond yield, is a code in parentheses: "R" indicates routine economic
data; "M" indicates monetary policy news (either Fed action or specu-
lation on Fed action); "F" indicates fiscal policy news, including news
about regulations and controls; "V" indicates Vietnam-related news;
"O" includes all other news, including news about oil-price changes.
The impression from reading the Wall Street Journal, both day by day
over the years and from this recent ordeal at the microfilm machine, is
that the overwhelming majority of large changes in bond yields arise in
response to actions by the monetary authorities and to releases of
routine economic data. Moreover, the effect of routine data on bond
n The author appreciates help from Arjan van den Born, Michael Crawley, John M.
Frost, Rohit Malhotra, Todd C. Lee, Jeroen van Meijgaard, and Coenraad Vrolijk, who did
much of the digging in the Wall Street Journal as part of their work in his graduate class
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yields often arises from speculation that the Fed will react to the data, or
that the data change the odds on Fed action. The experience so far in
1994 is quite typical: The bond market has fluctuated in response to Fed
policy actions, speculation on Fed policy, and release of new economic
data. Over the entire sample, fiscal policy changes, including wage-price
controls, have some effect on bond yields, as do foreign disturbances,
but infrequently so. In fact, if reporters and the bond traders they talk
with can be trusted, changes in interest rates are driven almost entirely
by the internal dynamics of the economy and monetary policy, and
hardly at all by exogenous shocks.
Before discussing the implications of Table 1, consider also the body
of evidence from studies of announcement effects. A sample of relatively
recent studies includes Cook and Hahn (1988, 1989); Cook and Korn
(1991); Dwyer and Hafer (1989); Hardouvelis (1988); and Santomero
(1991). These papers contain references to many other papers in this line
of literature. My interpretation of this evidence is that the size of
interest-rate responses to economic data depends primarily on the way
the Fed is running its interest-rate policy.
In the late 1970s, and especially during the period from October
1979 to October 1982, interest rates responded in significant fashion to
weekly data on the money stock (deviations of reported from anticipated
data). The Fed was paying increasing attention to money growth, and so
the market did too. After October 1982, the Fed paid less attention to
money growth, and the market did too. The Fed responded to data on
the real economy, such as employment and industrial production, and
the market did too. In 1986 and 1987, the trade deficit was a contentious
political issue. The trade deficit, especially that with Japan, had impli-
cations for U.S. interest rates because of Administration pressure on
other countries to reduce their interest rates. Through the mechanism of
foreign interest rates and their implications for the dollar exchange rate,
U.S. monetary policy was indirectly affected by the trade deficit. Thus,
U.S. interest rates responded to news on the trade deficit. As the 1980s
wore on, the Fed responded less and less to the money data, and the
money markets did too. Today, the Fed does not respond to money
data, and neither does the bond market.
Considering the announcements literature and Table 1, it appears
that the bond and money markets respond primarily to changes in Fed
policy and to changes in expectations about Fed policy. The more
confidence the market has in the Fed, the more the market will
concentrate on what the Fed is doing and the less the market will
concentrate on fundamentals other than the Fed. Consider an analogy:
If you go to the horse track but know little about horse racing, it makes
sense to place bets by watching what a bettor known to be well-informed
does. The market watches the Fed because the Fed is well-informed, and
because the Fed is the dominant player in the money market.108 William Poole
The more confidence the market has in the Fed’s willingness to do
what is necessary to maintain low inflation, the more sense it makes for
the market to concentrate on what the Fed is doing. This situation poses
several dangers. For one thing, the Fed cannot use the behavior of
interest rates to provide useful information on how it should adjust the
federal funds rate. The bond market today tells the Fed what the market
thinks the Fed is going to do. If the Fed is slow to adjust the funds rate,
for whatever reason, the bond market will not provide a clear, indepen-
dent assessment of the appropriate interest rate. In this environment, it
is easy for the Fed to make a mistake because the bond market will not
provide a strong contrary signal.
Should the Fed look only at data on the real economy, and at goods
and labor prices, in determining how to set the federal funds rate? If you
believe that the money demand function is totally capricious, then
monetary aggregates provide no useful information to supplement
output and price data. I am convinced, however, that the Fed should not
throw out the money data; monetary regularities are too well established
for that to be sensible.
Over the past decade it has been shown that aggressive and skilled
adjustment of the federal funds rate can yield a successful outcome. But
what happens if the Fed gets caught in a political box and finds itself
unable to move the funds rate enough? The answer is that in time
inflation rises and the costly progress in reducing inflation is lost. What
external standard can the Fed appeal to in building public support for
responsible monetary policy? Given the lags, appeal to price perfor-
mance itself is unsatisfactory. If the Fed does not tighten policy until
inflation is clearly rising, then it is too late.
The Fed basically has been operating on an unemployment-rate
standard. The Fed tightens if the real economy seems to be overheating,
eases if the economy seems soft, and tries for a neutral stance in
between. An unemployment standard is less than fully satisfactory,
both because the short-run Phillips curve is of uncertain reliability and
because policy designed to keep unemployment from falling is suspect
politically.
Restoring a Role for Money Growth Targets
The issue is how the Fed can build on past successes and reduce the
odds of policy mistakes. Greater short-run variability in money-market
interest rates would not damage the economy and would, in my view,
improve monetary policy. Note once again that before 1980, the Fed
followed a procyclical policy by permitting money growth and interest
rates to rise together during cyclical expansions and fall together during
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correlation of money growth and the fed funds rate to the short run--
periods over which the funds rate is fixed. Over longer periods, the Fed
has adjusted the funds rate aggressively, yielding a negative correlation
between money growth and the funds rate.12
The Fed should, I believe, allow the fed funds rate to vary within a
considerably wider band, perhaps 100 basis points, between Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. Open market operations
should be designed to keep bank reserves on a steady path. In practice,
the funds rate would often fetch up against one side or the other of the
band, which might superficially make such a policy appear operationally
equivalent to present policy. However, the market would know that the
funds rate could move within the band, which would force the market
to develop a view on future economic developments besides what the
Fed was likely to do. At a time when economic conditions were
changing, this policy would provide a smoother transition to higher or
lower interest rates, and market responses to incoming data would help
the Fed to determine the significance of the data. This information could
be of significant benefit to the Fed. At present, recall from an earlier
argument, bond market responses to incoming data primarily reflect
market speculation on how the Fed will respond to the data.
For an illustration of the value of this approach, consider the
situation the Fed faced as of mid May 1994. Weekly data on M1
suggested that the money stock was dropping rapidly (money growth
was actually negative), indicating that the Fed had been successful in
pushing up the funds rate enough to get ahead of the market. Suppose
that the Fed, instead of pegging the funds rate in a 25-basis-point band
around 4.25 percent, set a 100-basis-point band centered on 4.25
percent. Given that reserves growth was currently weak, the funds rate
would settle temporarily at 3.75 percent. If the economy really was in
danger of becoming overheated, incoming data on the real economy
would lead the bond market to expect a resumption of reserves growth
and a rising fed funds rate. The market would bid rates up, relieving the
Fed of some of the responsibility for making the judgment and some of
the political heat.
Closing Comments
The main issue today in monetary policy design continues to be the
old one of the appropriate role in policy for interest rates and monetary
aggregates. The Fed has been quite successful in recent years in
aggressively adjusting the fed funds rate and has come to the point of
essentially ignoring information from the monetary aggregates.
This policy, by the way, is similar to the combination policy in Poole (1970a)o110 William Poole
Ignoring the aggregates is a mistake. Evidence is overwhelming
across the ages of the important role of money growth in causing
inflation. The Fed has come to ignore the aggregates through a simple
but understandable error of economic analysis. Fed policy has been so
successful in offsetting disturbances and keeping the economy on a
low-inflation track that the correlations between policy instruments and
goal variables such as nominal GDP have disappeared. This outcome is
a predictable consequence of optimal policy. In an optimal-control
setting, the correlation between policy variables, or any other variables,
and policy goals provides no information whatsoever on the structural
relationships between the variables, all other things equal.
When I characterize U.S. monetary policy after 1982 as "optimal," I
mean relative to prior experience. In two recent episodes, more atten-
tion to monetary aggregates would have yielded better results. Policy
was too expansionary in the 1985-86 period, and this led to sharp
increases in interest rates in 1987 and 1988 as the Fed worked to contain
the effects of the expansionary policy. And although it is too early to
assess the full consequences of very recent policy, I believe that M1
growth was too high in 1993, and that some of the surge in interest rates
in the first half of 1994 could have been avoided if the Fed had started
earlier to contain excessive money growth. These, though, are judgment
calls, and others may judge differently.
The Fed’s goal today should be to build on its record of success.
Excessively tight control of the federal funds rate yields its own set of
problems. Because of the Fed’s success, the bond market runs off
speculation about future Fed actions and little else, which is not a
healthy state of affairs. The Fed is not omniscient; its job would be easier
if it could make use of the information about the future course of the
economy that is aggregated in the bond market. Moreover, with the
bond market hanging on every Fed move, the Fed is in the tricky
position of trying to provide direction to the market, and of trying to
prove to the market that the direction is appropriate. The Fed is not in
fact ultimately responsible for the level of real interest rates; real rates
are determined by the fundamentals of fiscal policy, productivity, and
thrift. But under its current policy the Fed is responsible for real interest
rates in the short run, and that entangles the Fed unnecessarily in the
politics of interest rates. These politics risk pressures to inflate that have
in the past led to policy mistakes. More attention to money growth
might help to reduce the probability of repeating those mistakes.
These are the reasons why the Fed needs to. modify its policy of
tight control of the fed funds rate. Current policy has been working too
well for wholesale redesign to make good sense. A sensible evolution of
policy would be to widen the fed funds band and restore some emphasis
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Table 1
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; Q=other
JAN 26 63 1.03 (RF) Dec, durable goods orders down 3%; Dec. CPI down; gold
outflow and fear of inflation cited; Kennedy proposes corp.
tax cut,
APR 20 63 .75 (RF) Mar. industrial production index, personal income, housing
starts all up; Mar, durable goods orders steady; steel price
increases--speculation on Kennedy response.
SEP 7 63 1.00 (F) Large Treasury advance refunding announcement surprised
traders.
NOV 9 63 ,73 (RM) Fed raises margin requirements; bullish business news.
DEC 21 63 ,73 (M) Fed Ch. Martin warns that tax cut might mean higher
interest rates.
NOV 6 65 1.16 (RM) Fears of tight money cited; Oct. unemployment rate down
to 4,3% from 4.4%.
DEC 11 65 1.37 (MO) Discount rate increase; Fed conflict with Johnson Admin.
FEB 5 66 1.79 (RMFV) Renewed U.S. bombing of N. Vietnam; factory orders
up; tax increase debate; Fed voluntary restraints on bank
credit possible.
FEB 12 66 1,32 (RFV) Mortgage interest ceilings raised; optimism fades after
Vietnam peace initiative; retail sales down,
FEB 19 66 1.52 (R) Industrial production index up; housing starts down; durable
goods orders up.
MAR 5 66 1.07 (R) CPI flat; factory orders up slightly.
MAR 19 66 -1,07 (R) Housing starts down.
MAR 26 66 -1.30 (RMF) Industrial production up; Johnson says tax increases
would be premature; tightening Fed policy noted.
MAY 14 66 -1.10 (R) Retail sales down; industrial production up; Fed favors tax
increase.
MAY 28 66 1.31 (FO) Treas. Sec. Fowler suggests bond sales above the 4,25%
ceiling; German bank rate up.
JUL 2 66 2.16 (RV) Fed raises reserve requirements; banks raise prime rate;
Vietnam bombing.
JUL 16 66 1,26 (RFO) Speculation on discount rate increase; unemployment
rate steady at 4%; British bank rate increase; industrial
production up; Fed cut Regulation Q ceiling,
AUG 20 66 1.68 (RF) Industrial production up strongly; personal income up;
banks increase prime rate; Fed raises reserve requirements;
July housing starts "plunged"; new factory orders down.
AUG 27 66 1.24 (RV) CPI up; negative Vietnam news,
SEP 10 66 -2.28 (F) Tax increase speculation, especially suspension of
investment tax credit (ITC); Johnson recommends ITC
suspension, cuts in federal spending.
OCT 29 66 -1.93 (R) Signs of slowing economy cited; U.S. Steel dividend
increase; better corporate earnings reports.
DEC 17 66 -2.34 (RF) Easing demand pressures--Nov, retail sales, industrial
production down; Nov. housing starts up; easier Fed policy
noted.112 William Poole
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
DEC 24 66 -1.52 (RMF) Nov, durable goods orders down 3,1%, further reducing
pressure for 1967 tax increase; Fed purchases coupon
issues; small increase in Nov. CPI.
JAN 7 67 -1.78 (RO) Nov. new factory orders down; Bundesbank cuts discount
rate.
FEB 18 67 1,80 (RM) Jan. retail sales edged down; Fed Ch. Martin states that
economy may soon resume rapid growth, suggesting to
market that Fed easing at an end; bullish capital spending
survey; Jan. industrial production down due to snowstorms;
large increase in personal income in Jan.; Jan. durable goods
orders down 5.1%.
MAR 4 67 -2,67 (RM) Fed cuts reserve requirements--market sees this and
other signs of Fed easing; Jan. new factory orders down 4.6%.
APR 22 67 2,00 (RMFV) Mar, industrial production up slightly; influential
congressmen say income tax increases may be necessary;
Mar. housing starts, personal income up; dealers believe Fed
easing steps waning; Mar, durable goods orders down
slightly; U,S. bombs Haiphong for first time; free reserves up
sharply.
JUN 17 67 2.08 (R) May retail sales, personal income up; May industrial
production down; May housing starts rose briskly.
OCT 21 67 2.71 (RMO) Sharp third-quarter GNP increase; Sept. industrial
production down due to strikes; Sept. housing starts up 3,8%
over Aug.; rise in rates attributed to tax increase delay,
concern over Fed tightening; personal income up in Sept.;
Bank of England raises discount rate from 5,5% to 6%; Fed
extends 70% margin requirement to currently unregulated
lenders.
JAN 6 68 -2,27 (RFV) Pres. Johnson imposes tight mandatory controls on corp.
capital spending abroad, and reduced voluntary ceilings on
bank lending abroad; Nov. new factory orders jumped up;
Treas, reports U.S. gold stock fell; reports of peace feelers
from North Vietnam.
MAR 16 68 3.90 (MO) Discount rate increase; heavy gold buying in London.
APR 6 68 -3.19 (VO) Pres. Johnson announces he will not run for another term;
partial halt in bombing of North Vietnam.
MAY 25 68 2.57 (RMF) Apr. housing starts up 8% from Mar.; rate upsurge due to
report that deficit-reduction legislation delayed; Fed credit-
tightening noted; Apr. durable goods orders down.
DEC 28 68 2.79 (M) Tight money market conditions.
MAY 31 69 3.16 (M) Speculation on increase in prime rate.
QCT 11 69 -3.41 (RF) Sept. unemployment rate up sharply; rejection of bill that
would have reduced tax-free status of munis.
QCT 18 69 -2.88 (RV) Sept. retail sales and housing starts up; heightened
Vietnam peace hopes; small increase in Sept. personal
income; Sept. industrial production down; third-quarter
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Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
NOV 1 69 4.04 (RV) Vietnam concerns; absence of slowdown in economy and
inflation worries; oversupply in bond market,
FEB 14 70 -3.49 (R) Weak economic data.
FEB 21 70 -2,82 (R) Jan. industrial production down 0.7%; Jan, housing starts
down 6.9%; Jan, CPI up 0,6%; Feb. durable goods orders up
1.4%; Feb. CPI up 0.5% over Jan.
MAR 28 70 -2.80 (RM) Fed Ch. Burns hints at easier policy; prime rate cut;
leading indicators up slightly.
APR 25 70 3,65 (VO) Announcement of troop withdrawal from Vietnam; CEA Ch.
McCracken says "worst of 1970 downturn is over."
MAY 30 70 4~69 (RO) Wholesale prices higher; threat of Soviet involvement in
Egypt; Democratic leaders call for wage-price controls.
JUN 6 70 -2.96 (RV) U.S. announces withdrawal from Cambodia; lower capital
spending plans; Feb. new factory orders down 0,4%;
speculation on wage-price controls; May unemployment rate
up to 5.0% from 4,8%.
JUN 27 70 -2.30 (RMO) May CPI up less than expected; Penn-Central
bankruptcy suggests less restrictive Fed policy; Fed
suspends interest ceilings on some large CDs; May leading
indicators down.
NOV 21 70 -3.18 (R) Speculation on Fed easing; industrial production down.
NOV 28 70 -3.62 (RF) CPI up at 7.2% rate; bill approved to extend Presidential
authority for wage-price controls.
DEC 26 70 3.02 (RM) CPI up less than expected; speculation on discount rate
cut.
MAR 13 71 -2.90 (RF) Feb. unemployment rate down to 5.8% from 6.0%; Feb.
WPI up at 8,4% annual rate; report on advocacy of wage-
price controls by Fed Chl Burns; prime rate cut.
JUN 19 71 2.85 (RM) Prime rate up; May industrial production, housing starts
up; May retail sales down slightly; discount rate increase.
AUG 21 71 -4.51 (F) Wage-price controls imposed.
JAN 20 73 2.54 (RM) Discount rate increased; Dec. industrial production up
0.8%; Dec. housing starts up slightly; market believes Fed
has raised fed funds rate range; real GNP for 1972:1V up at
8.5% annual rate.
JUL 28 73 2.13 (RM) June CPI + 7.2% annual rate; Fed Gov. Brimmer suggests
that rates will keep rising; June leading indicators up 1.9%;
prime rate to 8.75% from 8.5%.
AUG 4 73 3.84 (RM) Rising food prices, hoarding, shortages; July WPI down
1.4% (viewed as aberration due to export controls); July
unemployment rate down slightly; Fed Ch, Burns says that
Fed might have to take additional steps to slow money
growth.
SEP 8 73 -2.60 (RF) Nixon rules out tax-change proposals; Aug, unemployment
rate up slightly; Aug. WPI up by 6.2% from July (74.4 %
annual rate), largest monthly increase since 1946 (large
increase expected).114 William Poole
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
SEP 29 73 -2.36 (R) Aug. CPI up at 22.8 % annual rate; explosive price rally on
expectations of Fed easing; Aug. durable goods orders down
1.6%; Treas. Sec. Shultz says interest rates ’over the top.’
DEC 29 73 2.03 (RO) Oil price more than doubled to $11.651 a barrel by six
Persian Gulf producing countries; Nov. CPI up at 9,6% annual
rate; Nov. durable goods orders rose 0.3%.
APR 12 75 2.44 (M) Inflation fears due to easier monetary policy,
JUN 14 75 -2,18 (F) N,Y, City financial problems; lower than expected federal
borrowing.
AUG 9 75 1.15 (R) July unemployment rate down slightly; strong employment
report a surprise; July WPI up 1.2% from June.
AUG 23 75 1.84 (R) July industrial production up 0.5% from June; July housing
starts up 14% from June; July CPI up at 14,4% annual rate.
SEP 13 75 1.95 (F) Increased Treasury bond sales,
JAN 15 77 3,07 (M) Large increases in M1 and M2.
JAN 29 77 2.20 (M) Large Treasury issue.
FEB 5 77 3.85 (RO) Major weather freeze may cause higher govt. spending;
heavy bond calendar, inflation fears,
OCT 13 79 4.74 (RM) Sept. unemployment rate down slightly; Fed introduces
new policy; Fed increases discount rate to 12% from 11%;
money supply surge; Sept. retail sales up 2.2% from Aug.
OCT 20 79 2.45 (RMO) Sept. industrial production up 0.5% from Aug,; Sept.
housing starts up 4% from Aug.; personal income up 0.6%
from Aug.; M1, M2 up strongly; inflation fears from oil price
increases; 1979:111 real GNP up a surprising 2.4% annual rate;
deflator up at 8.4% annual rate.
OCT 27 79 3.72 (RM) Prime rate increased; Sept. durable goods orders up
5.9%; decline in money supply; Sept. CPI up at 13.2% annual
rate; some major banks increase prime rate.
DEC 1 79 -3.41 (RM) Prime rate cut; Oct. CPI up at 12% annual rate over Sept.;
rally attributed to narrowing trade deficit, massive purchases
of T-bills by Fed; Oct. leading indicators down 0.9%.
JAN 19 80 1.32 (RM) Dec. unemployment rate up slightly; Dec. retail sales up
1.1%, mostly due to price increases; Dec, industrial
production, housing starts up; M1 fell less than had been
expected.
JAN 26 80 2.68 (R) Dec. durable goods orders up 0.6%; Dec. CPI up 1.2%.
FEB 2 80 2.71 (R) Long Treasuries rise above 11% for first time in history; Dec.
leading indicators unchg; Dec, new factory orders up 1.3%;
Jan, unemployment rate up to 6,2%, from 5.9% in Dec.
FEB 9 80 4.48 (F) Large budget deficit; inflation fears.
FEB 16 80 2.61 (M) Discount-rate increase.
FEB 23 80 7.61 (M) Lingering effects of discount-rate increase.MONETARY AGGREGATES TARGETING IN A LOW-INFLATION ECONOMY 115
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
MAR 15 80 -2.36 (RF) Jan. PPI up at 18% annual rate; Feb. retail sales down
0.7%; bond market rally due to expectations of new Carter
anti-inflation moves; capital spending survey shows 1980 up
by slim 1-2% real; Feb. industrial production up 0.2%; Carter
anti-inflation proposals (incl. credit controls) announced.
MAR 29 80 3.29 (RMO) Feb. durable goods orders, personal income, up;
Venezuela cuts residual fuel oil prices; Feb. CPI up at 16.8%
annual rate; market confused when Fed permits fed funds
rate to rise to 25%; Treasury prices soar on flight to quality
given problems in silver, stock markets; prime rate up.
APR 5 80 -2.09 (R) Feb. leading indicators, new factory orders, down; major
banks raise prime rate.
APR 12 80 -5.04 (M) Unexpectedly low money growth.
APR 19 80 -5.87 (R) Manufacturing output down sharply.
MAY 10 80 -4.53 (M) Fed discontinues surcharge on discount rate.
JUN 14 80 -4.41 (M) Discount rate cut.
JUN 28 80 2.91 (R) May durable goods orders down 7.3% from April; May CPI
up 0.9% (10.8% annual rate); less Fed easing expected;
candidate Reagan proposes tax cut for next year.
JUL 5 80 3.04 (RMF) Large unexpected increase in M1; May leading
indicators, new factory orders, down; House Speaker Q’Neill
says tax cut certain in 1981.
AUG 2 80 3.31 (RMF) Fed cuts discount rate to 10% from 11%; M growth
strong in recent weeks; bond prices fall on fears of growing
federal borrowing, rapid M growth; June leading indicators up
2.5%; fears that Fed tightening policy.
OCT 11 80 -3.06 (RM) Sept. PPI down 0.2%; M1-A down $3.4 bil; Sept. retail
sales up 1.6%.
OCT 25 80 2.80 (RM) Real GNP up 1% annual rate in third quarter; Sept.
housing starts up 9%; M1-A up $4.1 bil; bond traders startled
by signs of economic recovery; bond prices plunge on strong
durable goods orders, growing fears of inflation; Sept CPI up
1%.
NOV 1 80 4.62 (RMO) Unexpectedly high CPI; Venezuela raises oil prices;
M1 up.
DEC 27 80 -6.55 (F) Reagan announces that his incoming administration
considering announcing a "national economic emergency?’
FEB 14 81 3.19 (RMF) Jan. unemployment rate down slightly; M1-A down a
surprising $3.3 bil; rates up on fears of heavy federal
financing; rates surged after unexpectedly strong retail sales
report; Jan. PPI up at 10.8% annual rate.
MAR 14 81 -2.86 (R) Feb. PPI up at 9.6% annual rate; Feb. unemployment rate
down slightly; prime rate cut; retail sales up 0.9%.
MAR 28 81 4.32 (RMF) Feb. durable goods orders up 0.4%; fed funds rate rises
to over 14%; heavy Treasury financing.
MAY 9 81 2.98 (RM) M1-B up a surprising $4.3 bil; Fed raises discount rate;
banks raise prime rate; Apr. PPI up 9.6% annual rate.116 William Poole
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
JUL 25 81 3.37 (RM) June housing starts down 11%; large jump in M1-B
expected to delay decline in rates; Fed lowers M growth
targets for rest of 1981 and 1982; real GNP for 1981:11 down
at 1.9% annual rate; June durable goods orders down 0.8%;
June CPI up at 8.4% annual rate.
AUG 29 81 4.06 (RFO) OPEC oil price cuts expected; July durable goods orders
up 0.9%; July CPI up 1.2%; heavy supply of new Treasury
bonds.
OCT 3 81 3.80 (RF) Major bank cuts prime rate; Aug. leading indicators, home
sales, down; bond rally on signs of weakening economy;
Sept. unemployment rate up to 7.5% from 7.2%; heavy supply
of new Treasury bonds.
OCT 10 81 -4.19 (MO) Decreased surcharge on discount rate; fed funds rate
down; Reagan pushes for less restrictive monetary policy;
Sadat assassinated.
NOV 7 81 -6.40 (MF) Discount rate cut; banks cut prime rate; Treasury financing
smaller than expected.
NOV 14 81 -4.66 (M) Negative money growth; speculation on discount-rate cut;
Volcker says Reagan must cut deficit and Fed committed to
tight policy.
NOV 21 81 -2.91 (RM) Oct. industrial production, housing starts, down; prime rate
cut; Fed eliminates surcharge on discount rate.
DEC 12 81 3.19 (RF) Nov. unemployment rate rose to 8.4% from 8.0%; higher
estimates of federal deficit from Reagan Admin.; Nov. PPI up
at 6.0% annual rate; capital spending plans for first half 1982
show 1.8% rise (real) from second half 1981; Nov. retail sales
up 0.8%. stronger than expected,
JAN 9 82 2.92 (RF) Nov. new factory orders up 0.2%; unexpected surge in
MI-B; forecast of higher rates by Henry Kaufman; bond price
rally on drop in fed funds rate; concern over federal deficit;
Dec, unemployment rate rose to 8,9%, up from 8,4%,
FEB 20 82 -3,40 (RMO) Iran cuts oil price for second time in 10 days; Jan. PPI
up 4.8% annual rate; M1 up surprising $2.3 bil, leading to
expectations of Fed tightening; Jan. M1 up at 20.7% annual
rate; Jan. industrial production down 3%; prime rate up; bond
price rally on decline in fed funds rate; Jan. personal income
up a slow 0.2%.
FEB 27 82 -3.34 (RMF) Iran cuts oil prices; real GNP for 1981 :IV down at 4.7%
annual rate; interest rates down sharply on decline in M1 and
economic weakness; prime rate out; Jan. durable goods
orders down 1.5%; bond price rally on drop in fed funds rate;
Jan. CPI up 3.6% annual rate; bond prices fall on increase in
fed funds rate; Jan. trade deficit rose to $5.13 bil; less federal
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Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
JUN 5 82 2.80 (RMFO) Apr. leading indicators up 0.8%; sliding bond prices
due to concerns over federal financing needs, increase in fed
funds rate; Apr. new factory orders, sales of new single-family
houses down; major bank lowers prime rate; May
unemployment rate up slightly; Israel invades Lebanon.
AUG 21 82 -6.76 (F) Fed funds and discount rate cuts.
SEP 25 82 -2.84 (RM) Aug. housing starts down 16.2%; Fed tightening expected
due to sustained high M growth, incl. M1 increase of $4.3 bil.
latest week; Aug. personal income up slim 0.3%; growing
belief that economy weak; drop in fed funds rate below 10%;
Aug. durable goods orders down 4%; Aug. CPI up at 3.6%
annual rate; Fed officials say they will tolerate above-target M
growth for a time.
OCT 16 82 -7.00 (M) Fed abandons money growth targets; lower interest rates
likely.
NOV 6 82 -4.01 (MO) Speculation on discount rate cut; better than expected
showing by Republicans in election.
FEB 26 83 -3.06 (RMO) Jan. personal income up only 0.1%; Volcker testimony
previous Wed. de-emphasizes M targets; OPEC oil price cuts
appear likely; real GDP down in 1982:1V; Jan. durable goods
orders up 4.5%; Volcker says oil price declines could help to
lower interest rates; prime rate cut; Jan. CPI up 0.2%.
AUG 20 83 -3.23 (RM) July PPI up 0.1%; M1 up a "surprisingly modest" $400 mil.
in latest week; July industrial production up 1.8%; July
housing starts down 0.6%; signs of moderating expansion
noted; July personal income up moderate 0.6%; real GNP for
second quarter revised to 9.2% (from 8.7%) growth rate; July
durable goods orders down 3.6%.
SEP 3 83 3.00 (RMO) Bond prices down on smaller than expected decline in
M1; July new factory orders.down 1.7%; July leading
indicators up 0.3%; U.S.S.R. downs Korean jetliner; Aug.
unemployment rate unchg.
JAN 5 85 1.87 (RMO) Nov. leading indicators, factory orders, up; Nov. trade
deficit up; M1 down $200 mil. about as expected; Nov. sales
of new single-family houses down 10.6% (considered a
"fluke"); oil prices down sharply Fri.
JAN 26 85 -2.79 (RM) Dec. personal income up "solid" 0.5%; real GNP for fourth
quarter up at 3.9% annual rate (revised from 2.8%); deflator
up only 2.4% (revised from 2.9%); bond prices rally on low
deflator; Dec. CPI up 0.2%; unexpectedly large $2.8 bil
decline in money; Dec. durable goods orders down 2.1%.
FEB 23 85 2.82 (RM) Jan. PPI unchg; Jan. industrial production, housing starts,
up; rapid M growth putting pressure on Fed to tighten; bond
prices tumble following Volcker testimony; mkt. believes Fed
has stopped easing’, personal income up 0.5%; real GNP for
fourth quarter revised up to 4.9% growth from 3.9%; M1 grew
$2.2 bil leaving money above Fed target.118 William Poole
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news’, F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
JUN 8 85 -2.97 (RM) Fed easing expected given signs of weaker economy;
bond prices decline on $2.6 bil. surge in money supply; bond
prices down on strong employment report.
DEC 14 85 -3.06 (RMFO) Payroll employment up "modest" 182,000; bond prices
surge on lower oil prices; interest rates down on signs of Fed
easing; Nov. retail sales up 1.1%; tax reform effort seems in
danger of collapse; Gramm-Rudman law challenged in lawsuit
as unconstitutional; Nov. PPI up 0.8%; Nov. industrial
production up 0.4%.
FEB 22 86 -2.95 (RMO) Jan. PPI down 0.7% led by oil prices; Jan. industrial
production, housing starts, up; expectations of Fed easing,
rumors of cut in Japan’s discount rate soon; bond prices
slump on Volcker testimony that Fed not about to ease
further’, fourth-quarter real GNP up only 1.2% annual rate; oil
futures dip below $14 per barrel; Volcker urges tax law
changes to discourage corp. borrowing; bond prices rally on
good inflation outlook despite unexpectedly large $6.1 bil.
increase in M1; Jan. personal income down 0,1%,
MAR 1 86 -5.12 (MO) Falling oil prices; speculation on discount rate cut.
MAR 8 86 -3.08 (RM) Discount rate cut; weak leading indicators,
APR 5 86 -4.62 (O) Oil prices down; Vice President Bush’s trip to Saudi Arabia.
APR 26 86 3.59 (FO) Weak dollar; worry over large supply in bond market.
MAY 17 86 3.54 (F) Worry over large supply in bond market.
JUN 7 86 4.30 (MO) Volcker suggestion of discount rate cut; weak dollar;
falling oil prices.
JUN 21 86 -4.11 (RM) Speculation on Japanese interest rate cuts, to be followed
by U.S, rate cuts; low CPI increase.
AUG 16 86 -3.70 (RM) Decline in retail sales; discount rate cut speculation; weak
leading indicators.
SEP 13 86 3.66 (RQ) Norway cuts oil output; stronger economic data; Germany
hesitant to cut its interest rates.
APR 4 87 3.34 (RM) Weak dollar leading to inflation fears; trade deficit concerns;
Fed worries about weak dollar suggest higher interest rates,
APR 18 87 4.39 (RMQ) Texaco files for Chap 11 ; Fed officials say rates may
have to rise if dollar weakens further; Mar, PPI up 0.4%; rumor
that trade deficit report would show large increase;
speculation on Fed tightening; fed funds rate up; Feb. trade
deficit up; Japan considering retaliation in trade dispute with
U.S.; major industrial nations agree on intervention to support
dollar; Mar. industrial production down 0.3%; Mar. retail sales
up 0.2%; Mar. housing starts down 3.2%; bond prices up on
Sec. Baker’s speech suggesting that Reagan Admin. ready to
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Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V-Vietnam-related; O=other
MAY 23 87 3.04 (RMO) Banks raise prime rate; Apr. PPI up 0.7%: U,S. Navy
ship hit in Persian Gulf by Iraqi air attack; Apr. industrial
production down 0.4%; signs of credit tightening by Fed;.
Fed’s main emphasis now on propping up dollar; Apr.
housing starts down 2.9%; report that Volcker said that
interest rates would edge up; rumors of major bank losses on
Third World debt and possible major bank failure; world oil
prices slumped; Apr, CPI up 0,4%; durable goods orders up
0.1%; dispute within Fed over Volcker’s stand on keeping
dollar from declining further.
MAY 30 87 -3.38 (RMO) Stronger dollar; weak economic news suggests Fed
won’t tighten; Reagan says he will veto any tax increase bill
sent to him; senior White house official says Volcker likely to
be reappointed if he wants another term; Apr. leading
indicators down 0.6%.
SEP 5 87 3.37 (R) Weaker dollar, inflation worries.
OCT 17 87 2.81 (RM) Market encouraged by Greenspan speech saying that
investors overly worried about inflation; disappointment in
trade figures produced major decline in bond prices and
largest-ever point loss in Dow industrial average; major bank
raises prime rate; Sept. retail sales down 0.4%; Sept. PPI up
only 0.3%; Sept. industrial production up 0.2%.
OCT 24 87 -6.23 ((3) Treasury bonds safe haven after stock market crash.
OCT 31 87 -4.53 (MO) Lingering effects of crash; inflation expectations down;
speculation on easier monetary policy in Germany and Japan.
JAN 23 88 -3.27 (R) Sharp narrowing of trade deficit in Nov.; Dec. PPI down
0.3%; Dec. industrial production up 0.2%; Dec. CPI up 0.1%;
Dec. housing starts down 16.2%.
JUN 10 89 -2.92 (RMO) May unemployment rate down to 5.2% from 5.3%; May
payroll employment up only 101,000; turmoil in China; bank
prime rate cut; Fed easing clear from decline in fed funds
rate; lower oil prices; 1989 capital spending plans up slightly
from earlier survey; May PPI up 0.9%.
AUG 12 89 2.84 (R) Unexpectedly strong employment report; July PPI down
0.4%; July retail sales up 0.9%.
APR 21 90 2.60 (RQ) Mar. PPI down 0.2%, core PPI up 0.3%; bond prices down
on heavy selling by Japanese investors; CPI increase much
larger than expected; Feb. trade deficit down sharply.
MAY 12 90 -3.90 (RM) Budget negotiations begin between Bush Admin. and
congressional leaders; bond market rally on weak
employment report and speculation that Fed might ease;
Bush ready to accept tax increases other than income tax
increases to obtain budget accord; Apr. PPI down 0.3%; Apr.
retail sales down 0.6%120 William Poole
Table 1 continued
Large Changes in Treasury Bond Yield, 1963 to 1993
Absolute value of changes > twice moving 2-year standard deviation or > 2.8 percent
Week Percentage Explanation: R=routine economic data; M=monetary policy
Ending Change news; F=fiscal policy news; V=Vietnam-related; O=other
AUG 11 90 4.47 (RO) Sharp increase in gasoline prices; July payroll employment
down 219,000--weaker than expected; long rates higher on
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; fears of wider Mideast conflict; "rising
oil prices ignite inflation worries";Saudi Arabia agrees to boost
oil production; Iraq annexes Kuwait; U.S. sends first troops to
Saudi Arabia; July PPI down 0.1%.
OCT 6 90 -2.99 (RMF) Budget negotiators agree on tax increases; Aug. leading
indicators down 1.2%; oil prices plunge; Fed easing likely;
payroll employ, down 67,000; Fed signals lower rates if
Congress approves deficit reduction bill.
DEC 28 91 -2.67 (M) Discount and fed funds rate cuts.
JAN 18 92 2.71 (RM) Better than expected employment report; Greenspan
testimony that Fed had done enough to stimulate recovery.
SEP 12 92 -2.40 (BMF) Interest rates down on unexpectedly weak jobs report;
Fed cuts fed funds rate; Pres. Bush outlines economic plan
with possible tax cuts; Aug. PPI up 0.1%.
FEB 27 93 -2.94 (F) Clinton economic plan for deficit reduction; Treasury report
of budget surplus for January.
APR 17 93 -3.00 (R) Lower than expected PPI and CPI data.
NOV 6 93 2.96 (R) Strong economic data.
Source: Data on weekly average index of the average yield on Treasury bonds with maturities of 10 years
and over. Explanations taken from Wall Street Journal. See the text.MONETARY AGGREGATES TARGETING IN A LOW-INFLATION ECONOMY 121
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T. H. Huxley observed that new truths in science often begin as
heresy, advance to orthodoxy, and end as superstition. It is doubtful
that Huxley had explicitly in mind American monetarism of the latter
half of the twentieth century (wholly apart from his being neither
American nor an economist, he died in 1895), but his remark is apt to
this discussion nonetheless. Monetarism, both as a positive theory of
the U.S. economy and as a guide to U.S. monetary policy, has traversed
just such an odyssey.
Advance to Orthodoxy
In the early years after the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
first freed U.S. monetary policy from the wartime commitment to fix
bond prices, monetary aggregates were far from the center of either
mainstream macroeconomic thinking or Federal Reserve policymaking.
Monetary policy in particular was still focused on fixing short-term
interest rates, albeit at a value that was allowed to change from time to
time. (Indeed, part of what it took to sell the Accord in the first place was
a presumption that these required changes would not be sizable, and
hence arguing that even small changes in interest rates could have major
effects on nonfinancial economic activity was a major motivation under-
lying the "availability doctrine" advanced by Roosa and others at that
time.) From the perspective of then-prevailing opinion, therefore, the
frontal assault made by Friedman and Schwartz in their 1963 Monetary
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History, and by Brunner and Meltzer in their 1964 attack on the Federal
Reserve’s use of an operating procedure based on free reserves (which
amounted to roughly the same thing as short-term interest rates), did
appear heretical.
Within an astonishingly short time, however, compared to the
usual advance of intellectual ideas into the arena of practical affairs, not
only academic economists but Federal Reserve officials as well came to
place increasing weight on monetary quantities in their thinking.
William Poole’s classic paper, published in 1970 but available and widely
discussed well before then, made a significant contribution to this
process. So did the Boston Federal Reserve Bank’s important 1969
conference. In 1970, the Federal Open Market Committee first began to
refer explicitly to money growth objectives in its policy directives.
The emphasis placed on money growth as an explicit operating
objective of U.S. monetary policy varied over the course of the 1970s,
but the trend was clearly in the monetarist direction. In 1975 Congress
adopted a resolution directing the Federal Reserve System to formulate
such quantity objectives as explicit targets, and the 1978 Humphrey-
Hawkins legislation required (and today still requires) the Federal
Reserve to report these targets to Congress in advance and to report
after the fact on its success or failure in achieving them. In a widely read
1975 paper, Sargent and Wallace reframed Poole’s analysis of the money
stock versus an interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy in
such a way as to argue that the latter was. not just inferior but
impossible, indeed meaningless. In October 1979, Chairman Paul
Volcker publicly announced that the Federal Reserve not only had
adopted a new policy strategy centered on targeted rates of money
growth but also would henceforth implement newly designed operating
procedures intended to enhance its ability to achieve those targets. Just
a decade and a half after Friedman and Schwartz and Brunner and
Meltzer, monetarism had in fact advanced to orthodoxy in much of the
academic world and among policymakers too.
Collapse and Retreat
The descent since that apogee has been even more rapid. In mid
1982, the Open Market Committee decided to allow substantially faster
money growth than was consistent with its stated target, and in October
of that year Chairman Volcker announced the abandonment of the
money-oriented operating procedures adopted just three years earlier.
Milton Friedman and other monetarist economists gained widespread
attention by predicting that the resulting more rapid money growth
would lead to renewed double-digit inflation, but experience falsified
these claims and in time people mostly stopped voicing them (at least in124 Benjamin M. Friedman
public). By contrast, the new academic growth industry became docu-
menting the instability of money demand. Over the next decade, both
internal and external views of Federal Reserve policymaking paid
progressively less attention to money growth targets--or to money
growth itself, for that matter. At the July 1993 Humphrey-Hawkins
hearings, Chairman Alan Greenspan formally announced the "down-
grading" of money growth targets as a focus of monetary policy. At the
February 1994 Humphrey-Hawkins hearings, according to The New York
Times, the one section of his written testimony that Chairman Greenspan
did not bother to read aloud was the part dealing with money growth
targets.
The well-known reason for this dramatic reversal is simply that the
empirical relationships that once connected money growth to the
growth of either income or prices in the United States have utterly
collapsed. As Kenneth Kuttner and I have shown (1992), data for the
most recent quarter-century of U.S. experience provide no evidence of
any predictive content of money growth with respect to subsequent
movements of either income or prices--or, for that matter, any other
macroeconomic variables commonly taken to be of interest for purposes
of monetary policy. The disappearance of these relationships is presum-
ably due to a combination of factors including deregulation, financial
innovation, globalization of financial markets, and no doubt others.
Unraveling and then quantifying the respective effects of these
disparate influences is, to be sure, an appropriate and even important
object of research for positive empirical economics. But too often the
researchers who undertake such investigations appear to lose sight of
their limited immediate relevance to monetary policy. The question that
matters, for practical purposes of monetary policy, is not whether a
sufficiently clever econometrician can suggest a new variable to include
in the equation, or devise a new mathematical specification among the
usual variables, capable of resuscitating some money-income or money-
price regularity after it has collapsed, but whether it is possible to
identify, in advance, relationships of sufficient stability and robustness to
warrant using one or another measure of money growth as an explicit
policy target. The Federal Reserve apparently believes the answer to this
question is no. I agree. On the basis of William Poole’s paper, it is not
obvious that he disagrees either.
Is There a Model?
Poole offers a limited defense of monetary aggregate targets along
two lines, one theoretical, the other statistical. The theoretical argument
is that while we have a familiar and well understood model describing
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per annum in the rate of money growth (however measured), there is no
analogous baseline model describing the consequences of a permanent
1 percent increase or reduction in the nominal rate of interest. Exactly
why the absence of such a model would constitute a valid argument for
formulating month-to-month or even year-to-year monetary policy in
terms of monetary aggregate targets is left unexplained. Indeed, Poole
acknowledges that, "As far as I know, no advocate of a funds rate target
has ever called for the Fed to adhere to a target path for the funds rate
announced a year in advance, or even three months in advance." Yet he
goes on to conclude that "no baseline prediction exists to provide
guidance as to how much or how fast inflation will rise if the central
bank, say, lowers interest rates by 1 percentage point from an initial
point of equilibrium. The problem is that an economic model with a
permanently (emphasis added) fixed nominal interest rate set by the
central bank has no determined price level."
Fortunately, any reader who thinks the absence of a baseline model
of permanent nominal interest rate changes is a matter of serious
consequence for the conduct of monetary policy need only look as far as
the papers in this volume by Jeffrey Fuhrer and by John Taylor, each of
which lays out a simple variant of just such a model. Taylor’s Figures 1,
3, and 4 do an especially good job of making this model intuitively
understandable. Whether either Fuhrer’s model or Taylor’s is the best
way to conceptualize the effects of monetary policy as implemented by
the central bank’s setting of interest rates is an empirical matter, of
course, although Fuhrer’s Figure 4 (upper panel) and Taylor’s Figure 2
do suggest that these representations may not be far off the mark for
recent experience.
By contrast, what Poole’s paper does not acknowledge is that the
central assumption of the baseline model based on money growth
namely, the existence of a stable long-run money demand function is
not supported by the U.S. data. Ryuzo Miyao (1994) recently completed
what is probably the most comprehensive effort to date to test for
money-income or money-price co-integration in any of the forms that
would follow from stable long-run U.S. money demand. Miyao showed
that even those few specifications that did appear to exhibit co-integra-
tion in recent years (the most notable examples are those based on M2
with an error correction term exploiting past residuals, as suggested by
Feldstein and Stock 1993 and by Konishi, Ramey, and Granger 1993) fall
apart when the sample is extended through 1993.
It is far from transparent, therefore, that the familiar baseline model
with fixed money growth has more empirical support than the models of
Fuhrer and Taylor with fixed interest rates. But regardless of how that
comparison turns out--and we should frankly acknowledge that in
policy-oriented monetary economics the empirical success of any given
model can be a moveable feast--the more fundamental problem with126 Benjamin M. Friedman
Poole’s argument remains: Since nobody he knows (or anybody I know,
either) has suggested that the central bank permanently fix nominal
interest rates, even if it were true that there were no such mode!, why
would its absence constitute a valid argument against using interest
rates as the basis of monetary policy operations? And still more so, why
would the absence of such a model constitute a valid argument for
basing monetary growth policy on money growth targets?
Verification or Superstition?
The second part of Poole’s limited defense of monetary aggregate
targets is statistical. Eschewing the familiar but ever less credible effort
to resuscitate a stable money-income or money-price relationship, Poole
offers a statistical argument to the effect that the lack of such stability in
the observable data is itself a sign of the success of monetary policy
based on targeting money growth. The chief implication of this line of
reasoning is that while the presence of empirical evidence relating money
to either income or prices used to be the main argument for a policy of
targeting money growth, today the absence of such evidence is an
argument for this kind of policy--or at least grounds for not opposing it.
The very nature of this reasoning makes clear the extent to which,
in the absence of supporting empirical evidence, the argument for
money growth targets in the United States has today become a matter of
simple faith. In the small child’s version of familiar make-believe, the
double magic is, first, that a toy stuffed animal comes to life and, second,
that this transformation occurs in such a way as to escape ordinary
human detection. According to Poole’s argument, money does have a
stable and reliable effect on income, but by the magic of optimal
monetary policy this effect is not detectable in the observed data. As
Huxley warned, here the discussion has clearly moved beyond the
realm of economics as a science grounded in empirically verifiable
propositions.
On closer inspection, however, Poole’s statistical argument simply
does not address the overwhelming bulk of the empirical evidence
against a stable U.S. money-income or money-price relationship. Fur-
ther, to the extent that this argument could in principle apply to one
aspect of that evidence, a crucial (but unstated) assumption underlying
the argument is itself contradicted by the data.
In his equation (1), Poole posits that income is subject to two
separate influences: money and something else, labeled X. The argu-
ment is that the more nearly the central bank varies money so as to offset
the influence of this X and thereby leave income unchanged over time,
the smaller the correlation between money and income becomes. If the
central bank were to vary money so as perfectly to offset the influence ofDISCUSSION 127
X on income, the correlation between money and income would become
zero.
If money and income were the only variables we could observe, this
line of argument would end here. But we can and do observe variables
that are candidates for Poole’s unspecified X. And once we do, we can
move beyond this limited conclusion based only on the simple correla-
tion of money and income as given in Poole’s equation (5).
The main point of Poole’s argument is that the simple correlation
between money and income goes to zero with what he calls "optimal
monetary policy." But optimal policy in this sense does not reduce, but
rather increases, the partial correlation of money and income (which in
the context of Poole’s equation (1) just measures the relationship
between money and income after allowance for the separate influence of
X). It is this partial correlation, or its dynamic representation, that is the
object of study in the multivariate regressions on which virtually the
entire modern empirical money-income literature relies.
Poole is incorrect, therefore, in stating that this line of reasoning,
directed toward the simple correlation between money and income,
provides "’the most important reason why the correlation between
money growth and GDP growth has become so small, as documented
by Friedman and Kuttner (1992)." Of the 210 separate regressions
reported in that paper (not counting the co-integration tests, which are
irrelevant to this argument), not one was a univariate regression. In
every case, the test statistics at issue were dynamic analogs of partial
correlations, not simple correlations. Similarly, every variance decom-
position reported there was estimated from a system in which two or
more variables (not counting lagged values of income itself) were
potential influences on the variation of income. Here again, therefore,
what was at issue was the dynamic analog of a partial correlation. Nor
was Kuttner’s and my work at all unusual in this regard. Just about all
of the recent published work documenting the post-1970 collapse of
money-income and money-price relationships in the United States has
similarly relied on partial correlations. Poole’s argument about simple
correlations just does not address these results.
Further, in the absence of evidence of a nonzero partial correlation
between money and income (or prices), this line of reasoning makes no
sense even for the case of simple correlations. Although Poole never
says so, a crucial assumption underlying his entire argument is that the
partial correlation between money and income is nonzero. After all, it is
this partial effect that the central bank supposedly exploits in order to
pursue what the argument labels "optimal monetary policy." But this
assumption of a nonzero partial correlation is just what so much of the
recent U.S. evidence contradicts.128 Benjamin M. Friedman
A Role for Monetary Targets?
In sum, a revival of monetary aggregate targets in the United States
today would be largely an act of faith, unsupported by either theoretical
or empirical argument. There are models of permanent interest rate
changes, and as Bennett McCallum (1981) showed some years ago, their
absence would not be relevant to the practical use of interest rates for
monetary policy anyway. Poole’s statistical argument about the simple
money-income correlation proceeds from the assumption of a positive
partial correlation and that is just what the voluminous (and constantly
growing) empirical literature says is no longer present for the United
States. Not surprisingly, Poole himself is appropriately cautious in his
recommendations. The title of his paper and of the penultimate section
notwithstanding, he does not actually call for "restoring a role for
money growth targets."
Other parts of Poole’s paper are interesting, but their connection to
monetary aggregate targeting is at best remote and certainly unex-
plained. For example, the analysis of large movements in bond prices is
a potentially very useful piece of work, and it may well become widely
used and cited. It may be true, as Poole concludes, that "the bond and
money markets respond primarily to changes in Fed policy and changes
in expectations about Fed policy." But why does it then follow that,
"The more confidence the market has in the Fed’s willingness to do
what is necessary to maintain low inflation, the more sense it makes for
the market to concentrate on what the Fed is doing"? One can just as
easily--I think more easily--argue that buyers and sellers of nominally
denominated long-term obligations should pay more attention to the
central bank’s actions precisely, when they are unsure of its commitment
to maintain low inflation. More important for the purposes of this
volume, why does this line of argument support an inference about the
potential usefulness of money growth targets anyway?
The fact that U.S. monetary policy has been so successful over the
past decade, by almost universal agreement, is not grounds for standing
still. Policymakers should always try to do better, and the risks ahead
are not necessarily well described by realizations in the past. Basing
monetary policy on interest rates brings risks of its own (I have
examined these elsewhere, for example in Friedman 1988), and compla-
cency is always dangerous in any case. New thinking and research on
how to improve monetary policy, and how to adapt today’s interest rate
approach to a rapidly changing economic and financial setting, is not
just appropriate but necessary. To the extent that fluctuations in money
growth contain useful information about subsequent movements of
income or prices, the central bank should exploit that information. I
have described elsewhere (most recently in Friedman 1993) an "infor-DISCUSSION 129
mation variable" approach to monetary policy, which is a way of doing
just that.
But all this is a far cry from explicit money growth targets. In the
absence of cogent reasons grounded in either theory or the available
empirical evidence, reinstituting monetary aggregate targets would not
be a positive step for U.S. monetary policy--although I suspect Thomas
Huxley would have understood the lingering desire to do so.
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*This list is limited to references not included in the paper by William Poole.Discussion
Donald L. Kohn*
William Poole has written an interesting and provocative paper
covering a number of aspects of monetary policymaking. His primary
focus is on one key phase of the policy process--adjusting the instru-
ment variable to get to ultimate objectives. He acknowledges that the
Federal Reserve has done a pretty good job of this over the past decade
or so, operating with a federal funds or closely related instrument and
keying changes in that instrument to a wide variety of incoming
information. In that information set, monetary growth has received
decreasing emphasis as the character and demand properties of the
aggregates have changed, loosening their ties to goal variables.
Despite the reasonably good record, Poole is concerned that this
process is prone to error, partly because the tight focus on interest rates
may tend to be associated with potentially constraining political pres-
sures. Certainly the history from the late 1920s to the late 1970s of similar
procedures produced enough examples of serious problems to warrant
raising these questions. Too often, this procedure was characterized by
policy that moved "too little, too late," failing to damp cycles and
occasionally exacerbating them. The improved recent performance owes
partly to factors outside the control of the Federal Reserve, and a central
bank believing that it had learned sufficiently from its history to
guarantee that it would not repeat its mistakes would be suffering a
serious attack of hubris.
*Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. The views are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Board or its other staff.DISCUSSION 131
Reserves Management
and a Flexible Funds Rate
Poole has raised a legitimate and serious potential problem, but I do
not believe he has come up with a legitimate and serious solution to that
problem. He would re-insert the monetary aggregates into policy and
inject a degree of flexibility into the funds rate by focusing between each
FOMC meeting on the quantity of reserves, not the funds rate, allowing
the funds rate to fluctuate over a fairly wide range in response to
changes in the demand for reserves. In his view, these variations would
allow underlying market forces to show through into interest rates and
would make it easier for the Federal Reserve to shift its policy stance
over time.
Even in its sketchy form, this plan seems to have a number of
drawbacks. It would impose a considerable degree of volatility and
uncertainty on financial markets. The short-run demand for reserves is
highly variable, responding not only to changes in income and spending
but also to a wide variety of special influences on transactions balances,
and it is therefore very difficult to predict. Recent examples of special
factors affecting reserve demand would include tax flows, which are
never adequately accounted for in seasonal adjustment, and the chang-
ing volume of deposits associated with mortgage refinancing. I do not
have data for inter-meeting periods as a whole, but our mean absolute
forecast errors for changes in M1 three weeks ahead averaged over $4
billion in 1993, roughly equivalent to a $400 million error in reserve
projections. Our one-week-ahead forecasts of required reserves in 1993
were off by an absolute average of more than $150 million, and demands
for excess reserves can vary for reasons related to the distribution of
reserves in the banking system, temporary clearing needs, and the like.
This suggests that the federal funds rate would almost always be at one
end or the other of the range--and mostly for reasons that had nothing
to do with emerging economic conditions--and could well be at both
ends within an inter-meeting period.
Any procedure imposing such costs would have to have a clear
rationale and produce substantial benefits. Presumably, reserves are
targeted because they are related to M1, but even over longer periods, as
Poole notes, the tie between M1 and spending or prices is very loose for
economies experiencing low or moderate inflation. The introduction of
NOW accounts made this aggregate very interest-sensitive over the
targeting interval of a year, and the result has been a highly variable
velocity. As a consequence, the FOMC had to drop its practice of setting
annual ranges for this aggregate. The lack of correlation of money and
income in the 1980s that Poole discusses may reflect optimal policy, but
it has also been the result of the changing character of "money" and the
greater availability of close substitutes owing to deregulation and132 Donald L. Kohn
innovation in financial markets. Tying open market operations to hitting
a reserve path would seem to lack a fundamental rationale, beyond
providing a cover for interest rate adjustments. Indeed, Poole’s example
from May 1994, in which he posits a drop in the funds rate as M1
weakened after the tightening of policy, suggests that his procedure
could have the effect of damping--at least temporarily--the negative
correlation between money and interest rates that he cites as evidence of
the Federal Reserve’s countercyclical monetary policy.
Nor would Poole’s proposal be likely to allow market expectations
about the economy or prices to show through more clearly to longer-
term interest rates. First, I do not share his degree of pessimism about
extracting useful information from financial market prices. To be sure, it
is a tricky business, not only because those prices incorporate the
expected actions of the central bank, but also because they tend to
display considerable volatility and may not always reflect underlying
fundamentals. Nonetheless, careful analysis using information across
maturities from a variety of markets--including those for equities,
foreign exchange, and even commodities--and together with data on
money and credit flows, can tell the central bank something about real
interest rates and inflation expectations, and about how it is viewed by
market participants. In this regard, the expansion of derivative markets
has provided new tools in helping to read market signals. Results are
merely suggestive and often do not have clear implications for policy,
but they can supplement other sources of information.
Moreover, under Poole’s proposal, markets would still be trying to
anticipate the movement of short-term rates, and they would have
additional information--the likely course of reserve demand to factor
in. One lesson of the 1979-82 reserve targeting period was that volatility
in short-term rates tends to feed through to long-term rates, despite
economists’ views that alternative operating procedures causing that
volatility should reduce longer:term uncertainty. I suspect that publica-
tion of M1 and reserves data would once again be met with major
adjustments in interest rates across the maturity spectrum--not because
money or reserves held any more information about the economy than
they now do, but because they portended movements in short-term rates.
The Current Procedure
I started by saying that Poole had raised an important issue--how
to increase the odds on the Federal Reserve continuing to move its
instrument in a stabilizing fashion. The obvious question is whether I
have something better to offer--some way of giving Poole greater
assurance that our praiseworthy behavior will persist. Unfortunately, I
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I see no clear alternative to the current practice of looking at
everything and making discretionary changes in a federal funds oper-
ating target. Specific targets for final or nearly final objectives like
nominal GDP or inflation, while quite important from some perspec-
tives, as will be discussed below, have limited operational content,
given policy lags. I expect that changes in financial markets will continue
to undercut the utility of money and credit aggregates or interest rates or
rate relationships as intermediate targets--though they will be impor-
tant information variables. And while forecasts are useful and policy
inherently forward-looking, policymakers correctly remain skeptical of
these forecasts, whether they come from their own staffs or from private
forecasters.
The Lessons of the 1970s
Nonetheless, I think the Federal Reserve can build on the factors
that have contributed to its relative success since 1980. As a result of the
experience of the late 1960s and 1970s, policymaking moved in two
complementary directions, which helped to improve it. The first was
towards a renewed commitment to a fixed longer-run goal, that of price
stability. Emphasis on price stability as a long-term objective, even
without a specific timetable toward that goal, has helped to discipline
the policy process. When weighing a particular course of action, the
public commitment to moving inflation down further will be on one side
of the scale, perhaps counterbalancing some of the pressures on the
other side.
Moreover, greater emphasis on price stability has led to increased
attention to inflation expectations, recognizing the role such expecta-
tions play in inflation and the costs of reducing it. This lends a
forward-looking cast to policy, and it helps to avoid some of the pitfalls
of the past; whatever the drawbacks of real interest rates as intermediate
indicators, they are better than attempts to judge the likely effects of
policy from nominal rates alone.
The second, equally important lesson of the 1970s was the need for
flexibility in changing instrument settings. Policymakers recognize the
limits of their knowledge. One problem with the car metaphor for
monetary policy is that we cannot see the road ahead, we steer by
looking in the rearview mirror, and data lags and revisions obscure even
what we see in that mirror. We have at best only a rough idea of the
response of financial markets to policy actions and of the quantitative
relationships of aggregate demand to its determinants, including the
implications of various monetary policy instrument settings. Recent
disputes about the level of the NAIRU (the non-accelerating-inflation
rate of unemployment) suggest that even if we could predict aggregate134




Conclusions for Policy Adjustment
Faced with a high degree of uncertainty, policymakers have drawn
two conclusions concerning adjustments to their instrument. One is that
they need to look at all kinds of data to assess their progress down the
road. No one piece of information will likely l~rovide a consistently
reliable guide to what lies ahead. Policymakers must pay attention to
indicators on the economy and prices for clues about underlying
demands for goods and services and inflation pressures. They must also
look at information from financial markets as key elements in the trans-
mission mechanism and as h~dicators of private sector expectations.
The second conclusion policymakers have drawn is that they need
to be ready to change instrument settings fairly promptly in response to
new information, recognizing that if they wait until all the indicators are
pointing in one direction, it will be too late. Flexibility implies a
willingness to act in advance of problems, to take some risks, and to
reverse field when necessary.
An overlooked element in maintaining flexibility is the nature of the
decision itself and how it is made. Poole’s monetary policy car is being
driven by a committee, and it is filled with vocal backseat drivers. Over
the years, the Federal Reserve has moved toward greater clarity,
accountability, and transparency in its decisions about instrument
settings. I refer not only to the publication of transcripts and announce-
ment of decisions, initiated this year, but also to the tighter federal funds
rate targeting that evolved over the 1980s and the more explicit confir-
mation of instrument settings in open market operations. These changes
have contributed positively to the accountability of the Federal Reserve
within the government and to reducing uncertainty in markets.
Some have wondered why these changes were not made sooner, or
why additional steps along these lines have not been taken. The main
reason has been concern about the feedback on the decision process
itself, including the potential loss of flexibility. One can see this clearly
in the debate about the borrowing allowance versus a federal funds
objective, so prominent in the transcripts for the latter part of 1987 and
1988. Changes in discount window borrowing objectives filtered into the
market slowly; the Federal Reserve really did have an instrument
without an announcement effect, until shifts in borrowing behavior
made this impossible to maintain. FOMC members are going to need to
take care that the current focus on every small change in the federal
funds rate--a focus made all the more intense by its announcement,
which seems to elicit public comment from other addresses in Washing-DISCUSSION 135
ton---does not detract from prompt adjustments in instrument settings.
Concerns about maintaining flexibility also have arisen in considerations
of releasing the language in the directive governing inter-meeting
changes in instrument settings; immediate publication of such language,
with the threat of attendant market reaction, could constrain the use of
this source of flexibility. And feedback on the deliberative process has
been a prominent point in discussions of transcript publication.
To date, the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s decisions and
announcements has not deterred needed actions. But reducing market
uncertainty and increasing public openness and accountability may
have subtle costs in terms of arriving at the right decisions, especially in
terms of keeping flexibility in policymaking, an attribute Poole has quite
correctly highlighted in his paper.